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The Order of Bourgeois Protest 
Abstract 
Relatively little theoretical work is currently being produced by Western "Leftists" on committed protest 
culture. Simultaneously and not by chance, Western Marxism has drifted increasingly away from solidarity 
with the concept and practice of the vanguard party and toward a more or less easy compact with the 
problematic of poststructuralism and postmodernity. This relative paucity of discussion of commitment 
and protest stands in significant relationship to two critical moments: first, a powerful, overtheorized 
tradition of Western Marxist debate about commitment and protest (Benjamin, Sartre, Barthes, Marcuse, 
Adorno, among others); second, a wide-spread, undertheorized work-a-day practice of "traditional" liberal 
(and not so liberal) academic research and pedagogy. Yet both Western Marxism and supposedly neutral 
scholarship in fact constitute an unacknowledged consensus: "the order of bourgeois protest." This 
consensus has monopolized discussion in the West of committed protest and has worked to obviate the 
issue of commitment to the party. The essay at hand attempts, from the perspective of Marxist-Leninism 
(Marx, Engels, Lenin, Gramsci, among others) to investigate and settle accounts with the order of 
bourgeois protest and, hence, to investigate and settle accounts with part of the prehistory of current 
"Leftist" sterility and impotence in the pressing matter of (cultural) politics. 
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THE ORDER OF BOURGEOIS PROTEST* 
GEOFFREY WAITE 
University Of Iowa 
For Yuri Davydov 
We can only build communism out of the material created 
by capitalism, out of that refined apparatus which has 
been molded under bourgeois conditions which-as far as 
concerns the human material in the apparatus-is 
therefore inevitably imbued with the bourgeois mentality. 
That is what makes the building of communist society 
difficult, but it is also a guarantee that it can and will be 
built. In fact, what distinguishes Marxism from the old, 
utopian socialism is that the latter wanted to build the new 
society not from the mass human material produced by 
bloodstained, sordid, rapacious, shopkeeping capitalism, 
but from very virtuous men and women reared in special 
hothouses and cucumber frames. Everyone now sees that 
this absurd idea really is absurd and everyone has 
discarded it, but not everyone is willing or able to give 
thought to the opposite doctrine of Marxism and to think 
out how communism can (and should) be built from the 
mass of human material which has been corrupted by 
hundreds and thousands of years of slavery, serfdom, 
capitalism, by small individual enterprise, and by the war 
of every man against his neighbor to obtain a place in the 
market, or a higher price for his product or his labor.' 
V. I. Lenin 
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The proletarian revolution is essentially the liberation of 
the productive forces already existing within bourgeois 
society. These forces can be identified in the economic 
and political fields; but is it possible to start identifying the 
latent elements that will lead to the creation of a 
proletarian civilization or culture? Do elements for an art, 
philosophy and morality (standards) specific to the 
working class already exist? The question must be raised 
and it must be answered.' 
Antonio Gramsci 
It would seem reasonable to assume that instances of committed 
protest in the various literary, artistic, musical, cinematic, 
philosophical, and culture-critical artifacts of capitalism constitute 
among the significant "latent elements" of "the mass human 
material" necessary for the struggle in opposition to bourgeois 
coercion and hegemony and on behalf of proletarian revolution, 
dictatorship, and culture. Whether protest is to be located in the 
artifacts themselves or in some specific analytic procedures is an old, 
but today still contested question. So, too, is the question whether 
effective protest is to be located in the self-conscious formal 
manipulation of the device in avant-garde cultural practices (in film, 
for example, foregrounding the artifice of the medium versus the 
suturing effect of realism), or rather somehow in the nooks and 
crannies of mass culture itself, since the very possibility of protest in 
the postmodern era may reside only-if at all-in dreams, fantasies, 
and the imaginary, rather than in any conscious formal intentions. 
The unexceptional (if correct) answer to all such questions must be 
properly dialectical and historical. But further, as I shall argue in 
"orthodox" fashion, the fully dialectical position requisite to 
formulate adequately and to construct provisionally a theory and 
practice of protest can not be provided by any single discursive 
practice available on the late capitalist academic market, including 
Western Marxism, and can be produced and activated 0111Y by critics 
and artists who, working in solidarity with nascent communist 
societies, can commit themselves to the vanguard party in their own 
social conjunctures. My argument to this effect addresses, I hope, a 
subject of broad theoretical interest. It is also occasional to the extent 
that it is directed specifically at (and against) the theoretical 2




underpinnings of contemporary "liberal" and many "leftist" students 
of the phenomena of protest in literature of the twentieth century. 
I. Situations of Protest Criticism 
In light of the relative and symptomatic paucity today of 
theoretical discussion of protest and commitment in literature and the 
arts (the situation is only nominally different in film studies), 
Adorno's reference in 1962 to "the now half forgotten controversy 
about commitment" seems regrettably apposite even now, well over 
two decades later.' Even if we consider Adorno's influential essay to 
be less than prescient (written as it was at a time when the neo- 
imperialist war was already hatched in Indo-China and about to rip 
nearly apart not only that region but also the aggressor, the most 
advanced capitalist country in history), and even if we overlook 
Adorno's own subsequent position (or effective lack thereof) with 
regard to those world-historical events, his laconic comment about 
our collective amnesia still oddly rings true. Certainly the level of 
current theoretical debate on the "left" about protest literature and art 
appears passing low when set against the compelling urgency of the 
arguments begun in the period immediately leading into the October 
Revolution and then World War II, and continued fitfully on to the 
early 1970s, the period now retroactivated in some quarters as the 
origin of "our postmodern condition." The sheer variety and multina- 
tional character of the "keywords" marshalled in those seminal 
arguments (e.g.: partignost, die Tendenz, /'engagement, commit- 
ment, partisanship, dissidence, relevancy, counter-hegemony) once 
signaled their vitality back when they were fighting words. Today our 
own paucity of theoretical discussion of commitment and protest-let 
alone a way of applying the theory "and using it to establish firm 
guidelines for all questions on the daily agenda"4-seems 
(over)compensated for by a variant in academic discourse of the 
return of the repressed. For whenever critics try to say something 
substantially "new" about the situation of literature in the 1920s or 
1930s, or even about contemporary protest literature in the 1980s, 
they seem compelled to do so, whether consciously or not, within the 
parameters of the "ordre du discours" (Foucault), "Kommunika- 3
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tionsbereich" (Habermas) or "problematique" (Althusser) "always 
already" prescribed earlier, albeit in quite different historical 
conjunctures. Not the least consequence of this mode of cultural 
repetition compulsion is that "we" seem fatally forced to speak about 
protest now at the level not even of tragedy, but farce. 
Thus a powerfully ambivalent attraction (often to the point of 
romantic nostalgia) draws "leftist" critics toward the brute energy 
and urgency of the texts generated, say, between the world wars by the 
"Expressionism," "Realism," or "Modernism" debates (including 
the well-known interventions of Klaus Mann, Kurella, Walden, 
Balazs, Bloch, Seghers, Lukacs, Brecht, and the later correspondence 
between Benjamin and Adorno) or by the equally important, if less 
familiar, "Cinema" debate that extended in Germany from the turn of 
the century to the early 1930s.5 Nor can we forget Lukacs's 
"Tendency or Partisanship?" (1932), or Benjamin's "The Author as 
Producer" (1934) and "The Art Work in the Age of Its Technical 
Reproducibility" (1936). We recall, too, the post-war arguments 
centered around Sartre's "What is Literature?" (1947): first, 
Barthes's barely veiled response in Writing Degree Zero (begun in 
1947 but finished in 1953); then, Adorno's more belated reply to 
Sartre in "Commitment" (1962) and the position taken by Adorno 
near the end of his life, "Cultural Criticism and Society" in Prisms 
(1967); and finally, Sartre's own reply to Barthes (but not Adorno), 
first in "Plea for Intellectuals" (1965) and then "The Friend of the 
People" (1970). And we remember the critical moments represented 
by these documents: Enzensberger's post-Benjaminian/post- 
McLuhanian analysis of the possibility of progressive protest in the 
age of mass culture, "Building Block for a Theory of the Media" 
(1970); Marcuse's reflections throughout the 1960s on cultural 
production in consumer society, including An Essay on Liberation 
(1969), so influential on the "New Left" and against which 
Enzensberger was partially reacting; Negt and Kluge's audacious 
post-Habermasian contribution to the cultural politics of the New 
Left, Public Sphere and Experience (1972); and the seminal 
arguments advanced in the late 1960s and early 1970s by Anglo- 
French film theorists for the progressive function of avant-garde 
cinematic practices.' 
Now, each one of these representative texts was of course deeply 
rooted in its specific historical and social moment: whether this was 4




the United Front or later Popular Front and Left Turn strategies of the 
Commintern; or the necessity for Leninists to respond to the 
Trotskyite Left Opposition of the early 1930s; or existentialist reac- 
tion to neo-aestheticist currents in post-war, post-resistance France. 
Later, the apparently different critical models of Barthes, Adorno, 
Marcuse, and Enzensberger, or of avant-garde film theorists writing 
in such journals as Cahiers du Cinema, Screen, and Jump Cut, would 
tend in different ways to vaporize the concrete historical references 
and functions of artifacts. But theirs were no less reflections of history 
and ideology, namely responses to the variously described "post- 
bourgeois," "post-Freudian," "post-literary," or even "post-prole- 
tarian" and "post-industrial" age ostensibly dominated without 
recourse by the excretions and cooptions of the "culture industry." 
And all the writers who were alive to witness it were forced, willingly 
or not, to situate their thinking and their actions around ephemeral, 
potentially promising, and then deeply disappointing events such as 
May 1968-or more profound ones like the (alleged) disorder and 
opportunism of the Western trade union movements and of 
Eurocommunism.' 
The historical specificity of the major modern theoretical 
discussions of committed protest literature should hardly dissuade, 
and indeed positively encourage, historical materialists to transform 
our negative theoretical moment, when discussion of commitment 
and protest lies relatively dormant, into an occasion to take stock of 
the situation by analyzing what it is that these earlier theories, 
especially to the extent that they reflected bourgeois and petty 
bourgeois interests, precisely had in common. We must look hard at 
what is, in fact, the prehistory of our own inactivity. By hypothesizing 
an unacknowledged methodological, ideological, and hegemonic 
consensus shared by these texts (with each other and with less 
theoretically charged research into the phenomenon of protest), I do 
not mean merely some "textual" or even "intertextual" coherence 
(e.g. the tangled significance of Sartre for Barthes and Adorno, of 
Benjamin for Adorno and Enzensberger, or Brecht for Wollen and 
MacCabe). Intertextual analysis cannot but shift the critical focal 
point away froth lived history and society. Nor do I mean to suggest 
that we should ignore the textual fact that most of the relevant 
theoretical interventions were profoundly and intentionally difficult, 
even to the point of deconstructive self-contradiction or hermetic 
indeterminacy. We should never rush, however, to celebrate textual 5
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"undecidability" or "heteroglossia" (raznoreeivost, raznorecie) at 
the cost of blinding ourselves to hegemonic overdeterminations or of 
making determined political actions impossible. "Advanced" theory 
ought to be leery, for example, of currently trendy critical positions 
that, leaping on the Bakhtin bandwagon, identify "the basic condition 
governing the operation of meaning in any utterance" as contextual 
(i.e. "social, historical, meterological I! J, physiological") and hence 
"heteroglot," whenever the ultimate aim is to conclude ahistorically 
and fetishistically that utterances are nothing more than "functions of 
a matrix of forces practically impossible r] to recoup, and therefore 
impossible to resolve."8 A valid theory and practice of protest will 
need to see the practical trees as well as the conceptual forest. 
The texts I have alluded to decidedly tend (appearances 
sometimes to the contrary) to avoid "concrete analysis of a concrete 
situation" at least to the extent that none provides either a theory 
adequate to the full range of cultural practices or, certainly, a detailed 
example of how one might analyze a discrete artifact. Nor can I 
provide more than an argument for the necessity of both in the space 
provided here.9 
A complexly motivated reluctance to provide empirical evidence 
or in-depth analysis unites into a virtual consensus of negative 
methodological coherence texts otherwise positively different at the 
level of consciously articulated theory. For all its anecdotal richness 
and topicality, "What is Literature?" (English translations, in a 
successful bid to market it as transcendently "existentialist," dropped 
the last section on "The Situation of the Writer in 1947") is a 
symptomatic, because only apparent, exception. Sartre talked there 
in sufficiently abstract terms about "the work of art as an act of 
confidence in the freedom of all men,"'° that an analytic critic may be 
forgiven for buying into the notion that Sartre's theses are adequate to 
"all literature."" Sartre's text was at least prolix in adduced 
evidence and plotted its main argument for committed literature in a 
way that was decidedly more than merely an arbitrary and self- 
serving "narrative that facilitates thinking about literature."12This is, 
however, precisely the temptation in which Barthes's response to 
Sartre indulged, with one concomitant that his readers are still 
seduced into the reactionary fantasy that a single novel by Roger 
Garaudy (virtually the only concrete example analyzed by Barthes in 
Writing Degree Zero) can stand pars pro Coto for all communist 6




literature. Nor did Marcuse's often florid or Adorno's typically 
minimalist remarks (at least in their explicitly theoretical writings) 
about Kafka and Beckett or other representatives of poetical 
"liberation," artistic "permanence," and critical "autonomy"-let 
alone Enzensberger's voluntaristic pleas for orgasmic cultural- 
political activity," Negt and Kluge's largely hypothetical construc- 
tion of a "proletarian public sphere,"14 or the post-Lacanian, post- 
Metzian arcanum arcanorum of so much film theory-demonstrably 
contain much that most work-a-day critics have been able to find 
helpful for their "explications de textes," "werkimmanente 
Interpretationen," or "close readings." Although I would be one of 
the last people to embrace the Know Nothing rejection of "Theory" 
so common among teachers in the academy (whose work is infested 
with all manner of unacknowledged theory), I believe as strongly that 
we must confront head-on the fact that the major theorists on the 
"left" of protest literature did share an anti-empirical bias against 
specific analysis that was, and continues to be, fixated in the form of a 
certain privatizing indulgence. 
One has to "leave philosophy aside" . . . , one has to leap out of it 
and devote oneself like an ordinary man to the study of actuality, 
for which there exists also an enormous amount of literary 
material, unknown, of course to the philosophers. . . . 
Philosophy and the study of the actual world have the same rela- 
tion to one another as onanism and sexual love." 
Up to a point "traditional" critics will fall over themselves to be the 
first to agree with their new-found (although otherwise strange) bed- 
fellows, papas Marx and Engels: "Isn't all that Theory just a lot of 
masturbation? No wonder Theorists are so damn blind to practical 
matters and to what our students really need!" And so it is that, in 
inverse proportion to the orertheorized (to be sure often intentionally 
non-instrumental) theory of protest from the 1920s to the early 
1970s, we are confronted with the flip side of a rather worn record, 
namely a drastically undertheorized quotidian practice of protest 
studies in twentieth century literary criticism. 7
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II. The Orders of Bourgeois Protest 
Now, from the perspective of most quasi-leftist, liberal or even 
conservative "common sense" pragmatism, the current situation for 
the analysis of commitment and protest seems auspicious. Several 
conditions speak for at least guarded optimism. The climate of critical 
opinion around various, otherwise quite different critical approaches 
seems to sanction at least some sort of shift away from purely 
aesthetic interests. The strangle hold of "New Criticisms" (read: the 
bad faith desire of consumers of artifacts to become "creators") 
seems effectively, if not conclusively, loosened in many quarters 
beyond the "left" (where it is occasionally alive and well). Most na- 
tional and regional academic organizations (including the Modern 
Language Association, The American Historical Association, The 
German Studies Association, The Society for French Historical 
Studies, the various meetings of professional art historians, and even 
bastions of conservative men's club academia like the American 
Philosophical Association) have sessions at annual meetings devoted 
to some version of "protest thought and culture." Typically the ques- 
tions asked at such occasions by scholars of national regions or by 
interdisciplinary comparativists are posed at sufficiently high levels of 
generality that a broad range of important themes might be addressed 
separately or even collectively: aesthetics and politics: sexism and 
feminism; formalism and realism: the theory and practice of the avant- 
garde; art and persecution and art and propaganda: popular or 
subaltern and high culture: modernism and postmodernism, et 
cetera. 
To be sure the term "protest" is rarely defined by its students on 
such occasions in any rigorous manner. It is hardly atypical that a 
once influential German book with the title "Protest and Promise: 
Studies in Classical, Romantic, and Modern Literature" claimed that 
"every poetic work, be it of classical, romantic, or modern stamp, 
constitutes its Truth as protest against our ossified consciousness and 
on behalf of the promise of universal consciousness."" On the 
economic law that under capitalism "all that is solid melts into air," 
the term "protest," too, sooner or later evaporates into nothingness. 
But lack of definitional rigor can be productive, as can under certain 
conditions even "non-reductive, causal pluralism..." And thus there 
is now available an enormous capital of primary materials for the 
study of protest literature on which to draw interest: we have, for 8




example, extensive collections and annotated bibliographies of 
oppositional literature and periodicals from various ideological 
positions, including "exile" and "inner emigration" literature of 
various types. From an empirical perspective, then, the only ultimate 
obstacle to progress would be quantitative: addressable if not imme- 
diately answerable by colleagues at scholarly meetings or in journals 
such as this one, a filling-in by means of discrete studies ("The Protest 
Literature of X") of the interstices of a grid always already laid out 
before us. Then it might also follow that the proper function of 
theoretical reflection would be to act as what Locke might have called 
"a literary critical underlaborer" to the vast but not ultimately 
unmanageable empirical effort, providing periodically updated 
critical states-of-research, metacritical projections of whence we've 
come, where we are, and whither we're headed. 
The problem, as even unreconstructed pragmatists know, is that 
"theory" by rights ought to be more than that. So while eschewing use 
or even implicit mention of the sophisticated theoretical discussion of 
committed protest literature produced by Sartre or Barthes or 
Adorno, some rather strident scholars, pleased to view themselves as 
on or near the cutting edge of their profession, develop their own 
theory or methodology in explicit distance from what one of them 
ridicules as the "material collectors, political rhetoricians, and 
amateurs." Darkly and vaguely intimating, for instance, that the work 
of amateurs in the field of protest literature is "meaningless or even 
dangerous,"" we are told that there is never anything "escapist" 
about "specifically literary responses" to the objective horrors of the 
twentieth century: indeed literary response tout court is defined as: 
more important in terms of developing necessary self-awareness 
and of developing human values than any political action ever 
could have been. Above all, it is literature which is our subject 
matter as literary critics. (p. 14: emphases added) 
From this self-serving and tautologous idealist position, which 
positivistically takes as unquestioned given the entire academic divi- 
sion of labor into "disciplines," it seems natural to write such things as 
this: 
Judging aesthetic subjects, i.e., literary works of art, as mere 
political treatises is somewhat like picking the plainest girl in a 
beauty contest as queen simply because her political views are 9
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"correct"-whatever "correct" might mean in this context. 
(co- 9) 
Noting that the word "mere" in this passage begs many of the 
pertinent questions about protest artifacts, we pass by other features 
of this formalist "argument" in silence. (Whether sexism is a 
necessary or merely contingent feature of this all-too-popular critical 
position is presumably not for us, but for "literary critics" themselves 
to know, since it is they who claim a monopoly on understanding rela- 
tions between "form" and "content"-all of which they believe to be 
"ideologically neutral.") 
The dominant mode of research on protest literature can be 
called part of the "order of bourgeois protest," in the dual sense of an 
ideologically inscribed system and of a specific problematic that 
commands only certain types of class interested questions about 
artifacts. There is nothing "wrong" with this order to the extent that 
we all (co)exist in a world of clashing and ultimately irreconcilable 
ideologies of the two major world cultures (late bourgeois and nascent 
communist). When it occurs, the bad faith resides in the fact of the 
refusal to take responsibility for the ideological position one holds vis- 
a -vis these two cultures and for the consequences of that position. 
A few examples of the order of bourgeois protest are required and 
must suffice. I take them almost randomly: one from the realm of 
"practical" criticism, one from "Theory," and one from the 
contemporary scene of multimedia and performance art. First, con- 
sider the following symptomatic remarks from a discussion of 
Hogarth's etchings: 
Beer Street was perhaps too "joyous and thriving" to be 
altogether convincing but Gin Lane, one of the great graphic 
masterpieces, that transformed the humbler regions of the parish 
of St. Giles' into a fevered vision, transcended propagandistic 
aims by its intensity.'9 
An operative but tacit presupposition here (clearer in the context of 
the book in question) is that certain values exist dormant "in" 
Hogarth's various works of presumed social protest and, further, that 
the critical disclosure and comparative evaluation of these works and 
this protest constitutes a socially necessary, somehow progressive, 
amd even sufficient scholarly activity. More specifically, the passage 10




just cited is initially grounded in unsubstantiated ad hominem opinion 
(as in the aesthetic valorization of the first clauses). The tautology 
consists in the way the supposedly crucial question is then begged in 
the parentheses (Gin Lane is essentialistically posited as a "great 
graphic masterpiece"). The consequent idealist absurdity is patent 
and not mere rhetorical indecision: an authentic work of art (and the 
criticism adequate to that work) "transforms" the "humbler" (!) 
regions of an impoverished and subjugated London district. Genuine 
art, or rather the romantic-sounding "fevered vision" of its geniuses 
(and, again by implication, critics) can never itself be "mere" 
propaganda when it is Good, True, Beautiful. Indeed, the "trans- 
formation" by protest art of reality never occurs in reality at all, since 
it is ultimately unnecessary and even undesirable that it do so. 
Obscured by the argument is the ideological and historical fact that 
when Hogarth published a "cheap" series of prints like Gin Lane or 
Beer Street the event was explicitly, in the words of one of Hogarth's 
own advertisements of 1751, "calculated to reform some reigning 
vices peculiar to the lower Class of People in hopes to render them 
more extensive Use."' Occluded from view, finally, is the fact that 
Hogarth worked so hard for copyright laws to protect his (and other 
bourgeois artists') mechanically reproduced prints that the bill passed 
in 1734/1735 to protect these rights from genuinely proletarian uses 
is still called in England the Hogarth Act.2' The then progressive 
struggle of middle-class artists, in which Hogarth was one seminal 
figure, to escape the patronage system and to appeal to a "larger 
audience" was at least double-edged: a way of consolidating and 
monopolizing art and visual ideology for specific class interests in the 
name of the general public welfare. Today the order of bourgeois 
protest more or less unwittingly replicates this ambivalent creative act 
at the level of ultimately repressive criticism, pedagogy, and vi- 
sion. 
Equally to be rejected, however, is the currently prevalent 
assumption that one can avoid the ideological traps and liabilities of 
"traditional scholarship" by shifting to "Theory." Compare the 
following "radical" text by a self-styled "advanced" theorist (similar 
passages run like Ariadne's thread through most apologies for 
poststructuralism, not to mention its founding texts). "At stake" in 
this example is the well-known Derridian deconstruction of one 
variant of linguistics at the turn of the century: 
What Saussure calls "the natural bond" between sound and 11
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sense-the guaranteed self-knowledge of speech-is in fact a 
delusion engendered by the age-old repression of a "feared and 
subversive" writing. To question that bond is to venture into 
regions as vet uncharted, and requires a rigorous effort of 
conceptual desublimation of "waking up." Writing is that which 
exceeds-and has the power to dismantle-the whole tradi- 
tional edifice of Western attitudes to thought and language." 
Recently there has been at least one incisive critique of such ipse 
inflated, and leftist-sounding rhetoric." But perhaps the best criticism 
was provided already by Marx in his attacks on the Young-Hegelian 
idealists of his own day who, in spite of their allegedly 'world- 
shattering' statements, are the staunchest conservatives" in terms of 
the effects of their actions." It is still the case: 
The most recent of them have found the correct expression for 
their activities when they declare they are only fighting against 
"phrases." They forget, however, that they themselves are 
opposing nothing but phrases to these phrases, and that they are 
in no way combating the real existing world when they are 
combating solely the phrases of this world. (p. 30) 
Poststructuralist theory finds its rough artistic equivalent in a 
performance work by Saul Ostrow in which he places a sign "Work 
for the Unemployed" in a vacant storefront off Times Square. Upon 
entering, the desperate, now hopeful visitor is confronted with an 
inchoate taped monologue on the artist's "politics" and linocut 
handouts reading: '.`Wages a Form of Slavery" and "Everyone Who 
is Employed Is Being Robbed." Lippard's penetrating comment on 
Ostrow's "perhaps courageous but singularly ineffective and even 
insulting piece" is this: 
Just as it is not a matter of jazzing up factories or city walls so that 
art improves the working environment without doing anything 
about fundamental social inequities, neither is it a matter of 
gratuitously provoking ideas without being willing to follow them 
through." 
If Norris or Derrida or Ostrow himself denies that he is "conserva- 
tive" in any meaningful sense of the term, and I assume they all do 
deny it, then one response is to raise the polemic ante against their 12




"cucumber frame" naiveté. Deconstructive anarchism is always only 
the reverse side, the binary term, of conservatism in practice. 
A petty bourgeois driven to frenzy by the horrors of capitalism is 
a social phenomenon which, like anarchism, is characteristic of 
all capitalist countries. The instablility of such revolutionism, its 
barrenness, and its tendency to turn rapidly into submission, 
apathy, phantasms, and even a frenzied infatuation with one 
bourgeois fad or another-all this is common knowlege." 
But not common enough it seems among our "leftist" cultural critics 
who, in their isolation and defeatism, often enough serve a counter- 
productive "terrorist" function in the academies of late capitalist 
society. This is what one perceptive Soviet scholar, Yuri Barabash, 
has rightly termed "a pseudo-revolutionary irritant [that] makes it 
easier to wage battle against genuinely revolutionary principles."21 
Much the same thing can be said, too, against the voluntaristic 
abandonment of art practiced sometimes by artists and critics- 
which, in turn, is not to deny that there come times, in the words of 
greatest Romantic lyric poet, when one "must throw the 
pen under the table and go in God's name where the need is greatest 
and we are most needed." 28 This is, however, a sometimes necessary 
tactic, not a coherent or productive strategy for real social change. 
The current version in literature, the arts, and criticism of what 
Lenin called "infantile disorder" may be one result, as Lenin himself 
lucidly argued, of the "opportunist sins of the working class." 29 Today 
theoretical anarchism ("Question All Authority!") and a coeval 
scholarly and artistic conservatism ("Do Nothing About It!") are 
both equally symptomatic of the "double consciousness" that elected 
North America its most dangerous leader. He was not elected by the 
majority of the trade unions and certainly not by their (to be sure as yet 
largely unacknowledged) vanguard party. The failure of culture 
critics on the Left to grasp this situation fully is particularly ironic and 
even pernicious in light of the importance in late capitalist societies of 
media politics and cultural hegemony-forces that culture critics 
should know most about. 
For whatever else Reagan may represent to his supporters (a 
return to traditional values, a refusal of modernity), he remains, 
even for them, vaguely a figure of camp, a poor man's cowboy 13
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most often associated with movies in which he shared billing with 
a chimpanzee. Reagan's ambivalent image only offers another 
sign of American culture's growing mythological self- 
consciousness. Indeed, perhaps only a former movie star could 
satisfy an age that is at once so nostalgic for, and so cynical 
about, clear-cut action and straightforward heroes." 
This formulation of the argument may swerve from the recognition of 
certain economic determinations on what Marx long ago called 
"commodity fetishism." Even Horkheimer and Adorno concluded 
their essay on the culture industry with the observation that one of the 
great triumphs of advertising is that "consumers are compelled to 
represent themselves via products that they are able to see through." 31 
What this insight should mean to us is that our ultimate point of attack 
must always be commodity capitalism and not just commodity 
advertising, capitalist industry, and not just industry. But Ray, as 
Adorno and Horkheimer before him, does broach the very serious 
question of whether there is any effective way for scholars and 
teachers on the Left in effect "to protest" against the Reagan-Rambo 
"mythology" by studying protest. It seems clear that they can do little 
as isolated individuals. 
III. Immodest Proposal 
I have suggested that the current state of academic analysis of 
protest culture is caught in a consensus-concealing antinomy: a wide- 
spread, undertheorized quotidian practice of "traditional," "non- 
political," or more or less "liberal" critics, scholars, and teachers, on 
the one hand; and on the other, a powerful tradition of overtheorized 
"leftist" reflection, which typically seems without practical applica- 
tion and which has exerted virtually no influence on traditional modes 
of criticism and research, incapable as it is to lead them or channel 
their movement in new directions or applications. "Thus we 
commence," as E. P. Thompson argued in The Poverty of Theory, 
"with a de facto sociological and intellectual separation of theory and 
practice."" Both moments of what I have been calling "the order of 
bourgeois protest" are politically debilitating to the precise extent that 
they occlude the possibility of strategies and tactics of effective 14




protest and organized commitment against the economic, social, and 
cultural conditions of late capital. In Lenin's uncompromising terms, 
however, communism simply cannot be initiated or achieved without 
dialectical interaction with this whole "refined apparatus."" And if it 
is the case that the entire Western Marxist tradition is systemically 
compromised by a "hypertrophy of the aesthetic," with enervating 
consequences for any working class revolutionary practice," then an 
equally deep sense of impotence and sterility is a fortiori expe- 
rienced, not to say celebrated, "globally" as what Lyotard and others 
have too precipitously accepted as "our postmodern condition."" 
A different, red thread leads through my reflections to a single 
overdetermined point. Protest theories and artifacts, like all protest 
practices, are contested sites for which we all (Right, Liberal, Left) 
must continually struggle with whatever weapons are available and 
appropriate. For the Left, however, individual contributions to this 
struggle are always inadequate. Individual protest against capital can 
and will be eventually coopted; a truly revolutionary party can be 
momentarily destroyed, but never coopted and never ultimately 
destroyed. Any theory and practice of "counter-culture" must be 
anchored, as Michael Parenti has correctly argued, "in an alternative 
politics and political party so that it confronts rather than evades 
devolving into cultural exotica and inner migration."36 
A powerful bourgeois consensus cuts across apparent 
ideological differences and denies the Marxist-Leninist thesis that a 
vanguard party organized on the principle of democratic centralism is 
absolutely necessary for successful revolution. Liberal and conserva- 
tive scholars would of course normally have little reason to affirm it 
and better reason not to. For them, the study of Left-wing protest and 
commitment remains a historicistic pursuit. For them, scholarship 
and teaching are not themselves acts of protest requiring ideological 
commitment, except perhaps in the sense that understanding 
historical and contemporary cultural artifacts of committed protest 
can help make micro-adjustments in a political and economic system 
which is already sufficiently democratic at base. Protest practices like 
Communist ones which historically or today threaten to exceed this 
order are readily and eagerly coopted, and used for legitimizing the 
rule of the bourgeois class. What is so interesting in the situation 
regarding the study of protest culture is not the position of liberals or 
conservatives, who could hardly be expected to cut their own 
(ideological) throats, but the stance taken by "leftists." Western 15
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Marxists (among them many poststructuralist and postmodernist 
practitioners of "Theory"), in spite and because of their ultrist 
rhetoric, themselves comprise a variant within the order of bourgeois 
protest. Their anti-empirical and overly theoretical biases tend to 
conceal the empirically uncanny fact that theirs is ultimately a 
bourgeois class allegiance. It is my thesis that Western Marxism's 
major theoretical statements on the subject of commitment and 
protest are indelibly inscribed by a fatal prejudice against 
commitment to the party. It is this problematic, which of course has 
historical and social as well as theoretical determinants, that I would 
most like to expose and to open up to debate. We must be wary of all 
self-fulfilling prophecies that an effort to do so will be doomed in 
advance, just as we must be wary of all self-fulfilling prophecies that 
Leftist academics or other progressives have no party to which they 
can turn. 
Interestingly enough, the "left" is quite ready to concede that 
organized Right-wing criticism can in effect produce progressive art. 
In the case of nineteenth-century France, for instance, it has been 
persuasively argued that it was in large measure the protests against 
Courbet led by bourgeois critics (who then as now "set the tone" of 
criticism) that helped transform the paintings by the "Proudhon of 
Painting" (in which, for the first substantial time in the history of art, 
working people "set the tone") into acts of effective political protest." 
We also know that progressive Liberals can organize themselves as a 
group with some success to protest attempts by the Right to coopt 
artistic impulses. Such was the case when German artists, writers, 
and critics banded together in 1911 to attack publicly Carl Vinnen's 
anthology "A Protest of German Artists," a vOlkisch slander of 
Gallic influence in modern painting." Equally evident is that this 
collective response, for all its positive anti-nationalist sentiment, was 
unable to call into question its own class-specific nature or achieve 
solidarity with working-class internationalism in the arts. 
So it is, too, that "leftist" critics today are singularly 
embarrassed by the fact that Benjamin (whom many of them other- 
wise idolize) briefly argued in 1934 the dictatorship ofthe proletariat 
was required to make "the conventional bourgeois distinction 
between the author and the public begin to disappear."" He also 
warned: 
A political tendency, no matter how revolutionary in 
appearance, functions as counter-revolutionary, so long as the 16




writer experiences his solidarity with the proletariat only in his 
attitudes, not as producer. (p. 689) 
To be sure, Benjamin's concept of "producer" was vague and the 
conclusion to his text undialectical; to wit: "The revolutionary 
struggle does not take place between capitalism and Geist, but 
between capitalism and the proletariat" (p. 701). This serious 
theoretical slippage occurred, however, not because Benjamin was 
unable see the problem of capitalist hegemony, but because he could 
not see it through. This prototypical Western Marxist intellectual 
could not bring himself to see the party as the only effective way of 
opposing dominant hegemony and simultaneously producing and 
leading the forces of counter-hegemony. It was in a not entirely 
dissimilar manner, in spite of his many real differences with 
Benjamin, that Lukacs, two years earlier, had constructed his 
argument against Trotsky." Lukacs, I think correctly, attacked 
Trotsky's dangerously mechanistic separation "in essence," as 
Trotsky put it, of the dictatorship of the proletariat from "the 
organization for the production of the culture of a new society. "41 
Lukacs's manifest concern, of course, was to argue on behalf of objec- 
tive "partisanship" and against merely subjective "tendency" in 
literature and in criticism. But his argument to that effect curiously 
defined literary partisanship less in terms of Lenin's more flexible 
conception of the democratic centralism of the party,42 than in terms 
of "the proletariat itself ' -a position Lukacs later saw, as part of his 
own ruthless self-criticism of a similar problem in History and Class 
Consciousness, as an aspect of "messianic sectarianism."'" However 
one chooses to interpret this moment in Lukacsian theory," I would 
insist that what was ultimately at issue in the entire "Modernism 
Debate" was not Formalism, or any other aspect of literature, but the 
necessity for a vanguard party. And this is just the issue still occluded 
from view by all contemporary Western scholars of this debate. But 
then of course none of current Western Marxist theory appeals even 
to this Benjamin, let alone this Lukacs. 
The anti-party bias is so deeply and fundamentally entrenched in 
"leftist" discussion of commitment and protest literature that it is high 
time for the "left" to really debate it. Perhaps nothing better illustrates 
the obstacles it will then face than certain tendencies in Sartre's 
"What is Literature?" and in the response it has generated. 
For Sartre, "actual literature [la litterature en acte] can only 17
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achieve its full essence in a classless society" ("Qu'est-ce que la 
litterature?" p. 194). But precisely this entirely correct slogan is made 
unrealizable by Sartre. His notion of "freedom" is resolutely intransi- 
tive; it is hardly ever conceived as freedom for something. Or rather, 
freedom is displaced from the rest of reality into part of it: into writing 
and reading, and hence into the ideal state (recognized as such by 
Sartre) of a "free dream" or, alternatively, of a "pact of generosity 
between author and reader" (p. 105). This reciprocal contract he 
terms a "symmetrical and inverse appeal" (pp. 100-01). But it is not, 
as he thinks, "dialectical" (pp. 100-01), but hermeneutically circular. 
(It is probably derived from Heidegger's notion of Vorhabe and 
prefigures by several decades Iser's notion of Appellstruktur.45) 
Questions of the ideological determinations on such dreamy pacts are 
left unspecified as one result of the grammatically uncertain status of 
"freedom." Further, if the Heideggerian sources of Sartre's "What is 
Literature?" dictate an abstract relation to fundamental ontology (in 
the form of Sartre's existentialist Entwurf), then a kind of neo- 
Kantian, empirio-critical epistemology (a la Vaihinger) intrudes to 
argue that we can only conceive of freedom in the mode of absurdity: 
"as if this world had its source in human freedom" (p. 106; emphases 
added). The consequences for the ensuing conception of "commit- 
ment" are serious. A free-floating sense of objective reference and a 
lack of specificity about historical freedom legislates in advance 
against Sartre's noble attempts, especially in the third section of his 
essay, to situate writers and readers concretely as members of a class 
or, in the fourth section, as participants in a concrete historical 
conjuncture circa 1947. Sartre's text, for all its struggle to use 
ideological and historical categories of analysis, drifts irrevocably 
into its famous absolute dicta. Thus "all prose is in essence 
utilitarian" (p. 70). By this Sartre of course means that all prose 
literature is political. This may sound intuitively correct to Marxists 
coming from Eagleton and others. But Sartre also means that 
committed literature is political a priori. It is more than ironic that 
supposedly "dogmatic" Marxists (whom Sartre, Barthes, Adorno, 
and all Western Marxists after them prefer to call "Stalinists") deny 
that artifacts or their reception are political (or anything else) "by 
definition," but only in one of their aspects and in the last instance, 
namely depending on concrete functions at given moments in the class 
struggle. 
Sartre's tendency toward abstraction works in tandem with a 18




tendency toward spontaneism: "To speak is to act" (p. 72). He 
demands that committed writers elicit from themselves and others 
"the engagement of immediate spontaneity" (p. 76). But there is 
nothing "spontaneous" (in the sense of historically unsituated) about 
Sartre's use and abuse of a wholly undefined notion of "permanent 
revolution"-and in 1947 this was particularly irresponsible 
politically. He brings the penultimate section of his essay to a close by 
saying: "In a word, literature is, in essence, the subjectivity of a 
society in permanent revolution" (p. 196). This is literary Trotskyism 
at its worst. By this existentialist move, Sartre would point toward a 
world, as he had said earlier, "without dictatorship" (p. 160); but in 
the full context of his argument this can only mean "without a 
dictatorship of the proletariat." And without that there can be no 
basis for a single substantial proletarian freedom in the world in 
which we live. 
For Sartre, the "classless society" he envisioned as the only 
acceptable foundation for a free literature, and to which he claims he 
is committed (p. 194), cannot have any basis in reality. Or rather, it 
can-but only qua readers and writers in allegedly "free" social 
contract with one another. Intellectuals (i.e. those who read and write 
committed prose literature) are, however, "perpetually unclassed 
[perpetuels declasses]" (p. 146; emphases added). This influential 
claim reveals the class solidarity behind Sartre's own argument. As 
he himself said of an earlier century, "the bourgeois could be 
recognized by the fact that he denied the existence of social classes, 
particularly of the bourgeoisie" (p. 159). As Yuri Davydov has been 
able to show brilliantly, Sartre's finally bourgeois argument for 
committed literature crucially displaces commitment to the party. 
"The party of literature" associates itself in the last instance with no 
other real party but itself." Sublimated commitment can only admit, 
at the most honest and desperate moment in Sartre's text, that 
although "it is possible to conceive of a free society, we have at our 
disposal no practical means whatsoever of realizing it" (p. 197; 
emphases added). 
Still in 1965, Sartre's intellectual was "vainly searching for his 
integration into society, only in the end to encounter solitude," a 
solitude which he could at best "choose."" After 1968, when the 
Events of May had flashed an ignis fatuus of revolution across the 
capitalist world, Sartre began dreaming, too late, of "organizations 
that would bring workers and intellectuals together."'" But this 19
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"friend of the people" could only lamely come up with "guys like the 
68ers [des types sortis de Mai]" for his revolutionary base ("L'Ami 
du peuple," p. 476).49 
Whatever else is transpiring in it, Barthes's reply to Sartre in 
Writing Degree Zero closes with no significant aspect of the 
problematic just adumbrated, and so replicates it at another 
discursive level. Barthes himself apparently believed that he had 
somehow "Marxianized" Sartre's notion of commitment." But the 
effect of what Barthes in fact did was to attack a certain kind of 
"communist" writer, or rather "scriptor [scripteur] halfway between 
the party member [le militant] and the writer [l'ecrivain]."" This was 
the scriptor later identified mirabile dictu as Garaudy. For him, 
language "tends to become the sufficient sign of commitment" 
(p. 41). This accurate description of a very real problem is applicable, 
however, to no style of writing more than Barthes's own: that of the 
ecrivain for whom language never is a transparent medium but always 
a self-conscious exploration of "duplicities." Such authentic writing 
or ecriture (by the time of S/Z, Barthes seems to say that he is sooner 
describing a mode of reading) is constituted in the full knowledge of 
an "ambivalent reality" wherein a "tragic reversal" occurs away from 
"confrontation with reality" to "the instruments of creation" (pp. 26- 
27). Such writing is the "morality of form," although admittedly it 
always "falls short of revolution" (p. 26). What is really hidden 
beneath the surface of this implicit critique of Sartrean commitment is 
the fact that the reason why (some) communist writers "go on keeping 
bourgeois writing alive long after they themselves gave it up" is not 
because they are powerless to create an immediately "free writing" 
(p. 103). They never intended to do so. Communist writers ought to 
believe quite the opposite, namely that a free society under First 
World conditions can only be constructed through revolution on the 
base of bourgeois society and, further, that individual bourgeois or 
communist writers and their written "signs" can at best provide some 
of the necessary but never the sufficient conditions for actually 
achieving social and economic freedom. 
Perceptive bourgeois commentators on Barthes's project are 
only too happy to see in Barthean literature an "agonized suspen- 
sion" between literary "commitment" (Sartre!) and literary "self- 
transcendence" (Adorno ?).52 It is here that Sontag locates the proper 
terrain of the "responsible critic" (p. 'xxii). Yet neither she nor 
Barthes himself has anyway of escaping the suspended animation of 20




disembodied critical perception that is ostensibly "between" political 
engagement and self-referential undecidability. Just as with Sartre's 
position (supposedly one extreme pole of a "spectrum" that Sontag 
thinks we need to "mediate"), critical energies are diverted from the 
creation of classless society, and the party necessary to realize it, 
toward a literature conceived as "the Utopia of language" (Le Degre 
zero, p. 146). This "advanced" position of bourgeois literary 
criticism ends up negating all human subjectivity, first, because it 
cannot conceive of a collective one and, second, because it has the 
honesty to despise its own self-serving solipsism. Thus Barthes later 
admitted (in terms reminiscent of Mallarme's famous ascetic remark 
that he "only existed on paper, and there so little"): 
I have no biography, that is to say, since the time of my first 
written line, I no longer see myself . . . , everything happens via 
writing." 
Barthes is perhaps not, as Culler thinks, a "hedonist"" so much 
as he is, in Steve Ungar's cunning application of a phrase, "the 
professor of desire."" But it is precisely hedonism and desire that are 
rigorously absent from the second great response on the "left" to 
Sartrean commitment, namely that of Adorno. If Barthes's reply has 
determined much of the Anglo-French poststructuralist position vis- 
a -vis commitment and protest, then Adorno's lies near the root of the 
position of the other, German half of Western Marxist (and now 
postmodernist) "Theory." 
Sartre tried hard to demonstrate that prose literature coincided 
qua genre with political commitment, but he did not conceive of it as 
an effective instrument of specific political rivalry. Thus was obviated 
the question of whether writers should associate themselves with any 
party; in fact Sartre excluded this possibility in advance. It is here that 
the deepest level of agreement between the Sartre and Barthes of the 
late 1940s and early 1950s and the early Frankfurt School of the 
1930s is to be located." For the arch hedonist Marcuse, "rebellious 
art" came to have the miraculous power to be "a liberating force on 
the societal scale."" His was the flower-child faith that "Beauty has 
the power to check aggression: it forbids and immobilizes the 
aggressor" (p. 26). For Marcuse, commitment to or truck with any 
"centralized communist organization" had to be abandoned perma- 
nently-in his case on behalf of "anarchist liberation" (p. 89). And so 
it came eventually to pass that in the end Marcuse could locate an 21
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authentic revolution "hitherto suppressed in the previous historical 
revolutions" only in "the remembrance of things past."" 
This damnably unproductive anti-party bias takes a less effusive 
tone, but, as such, may be more influential, in Adorno's most expan- 
sive statement about Sartrean commitment, one which he delayed 
making until 1962. As we saw, Barthes had effectively brushed aside 
Sartre's false question of genre to begin the long, on-going project of 
eliminating Sartre's committed subject from the debate on committed 
protest, only unwittingly to have a supposedly hyper-selfconscious 
subject recur as a mode of writing that always rebounds to have 
physical contact only with itself. As if already anticipating Sontag's 
popularizing reading of Barthes's project as an act of mediation, 
Adorno explicitly denied that for him the question of art was in any 
way one of a "compromise between commitment and autonomy" 
("Engagement," pp. 429-30). But Adorno's apparently independent 
response to Sartre was to take only a nominally different tack in 
eliminating the subject from history: the personification by 
"immanent criticism" of what he called the "autonomous aesthetic 
object." This object, rather like Bishop Berkeley's God, did not even 
require that it be viewed by living people in lived history. On Adorno's 
intricate argument: 
The primacy of the aesthetic object as one that is perfectly 
formed does not entail smuggling back in by detour consump- 
tion, and therefore false understanding. For although the moment 
of pleasure, even were it extirpated from the effect of a work, 
constantly recurs in it, nevertheless the principle that supports 
autonomous works is not any context of effectivity, but rather 
only their own inherent and self-sufficient structure Iihr Gefiige 
bei sich selbstj. They are knowledge qua nonconceptual object. 
Herein rests their dignity. It is not they that have to persuade 
humans of this dignity, simply by virtue of the fact that dignity is 
given unto them. This is why the time has come in Germany to 
speak on behalf of the autonomous rather than the committed 
work. The committed work all too readily credits itself with all 
the noble values, only then to play tricks on them. (pp. 428-29) 
Authentic works of art "are knowledge," "pleasure recurs in them," 
they "do not need to persuade people" that they "have dignity given 
unto them,- they don't "play tricks" on the noble values. This 22




grammatical personification is no contingent rhetorical dross. It is 
absolutely necessary to Adorno's argument since it is left to art works 
alone to combat the "cultural twaddle" of mass culture: "They have 
been charged with the task of wordlessly holding fast to what is barred 
from politics," at just the moment when "the paralysis of politics 
approaches" (p. 430). This type of Cold War thesis" should be read 
less as a self-denunciation or self-immolation of the man Adorno 
himself than of whatever remains of the class position occupied by 
him and Marcuse and Sartre and Barthes. The eschatological tone of 
Adorno, the benevolent guru tone of Marcuse, the vibrantly engaged 
tone of Sartre, the increasingly onanistic tone of Barthes thus all 
reveal a common class consensus and its largely unexamined anti- 
party prejudice (Sartre's other writing contains exceptions). 
Adorno's "positive" answer to this grave historical and social 
aporia on the Left was of course a necessarily negative one: the proto- 
postmodern gesture of "immanent criticism." According to immanent 
criticism, for example, what is false about ideology is only "its preten- 
sion to correspond to reality. "60 By "reality" is meant all reality. With 
this drastic slight of hand is eliminated most especially the necessity 
or possibility of ever committing oneself, let alone a group of people, 
to the specific ideology of any specific class. Again and again analysis 
turns away in disgust both from the filthy empiricity of the culture 
industry and from its allegedly passive reception (both of which are 
now celebrated by postmodernism's simple inversion of "immanent 
criticism"). Adorno himself had nowhere else to turn but toward 
"autonomous works of art." Again and again it is they that take on the 
life denied human participants in history: 
The successful artistic construct is less one that resolves objec- 
tive contradictions in a spurious harmony but rather, according 
to immanent criticism, one that expresses the idea of harmony 
negatively, by embodying the contradictions, pure and without 
compromise, in its innermost structure. (p. 27) 
Authentic works of art do not "resolve contradictions," they "express 
ideas" and "embody contradictions." There is nothing else left, and 
certainly no flesh and blood human being, to protest or have 
commitment, save perhaps a suitably disembodied "dialectical cul- 
ture critic" who somehow "must both participate in culture and not 
participate" (p. 29). 23
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Contrast this aesthetic nihilism with the claims made by Gramsci 
for an actively dynamic Marxist-Leninism. "The philosophy of 
praxis" he defined as this: 
a philosophy that has been liberated (or is attempting to liberate 
itself) from any unilateral and fanatical ideological elements; it is 
consciousness full of contradictions, in which the philosopher 
himself, understood both individually and as an entire social 
group, not only grasps the contradictions, but posits himself as an 
element of the contradiction and elevates this element to a 
principle of knowledge and therefore of action.'" 
This argument powerfully restores, in the face of "leftist" proto- 
postmodern antihumanism, the possibility of a properly human 
subject: not a bourgeois subject (and certainly not a hypostasized, 
autonomous work of art or bloodless moment of immanent criticism), 
but rather the individual as participant in the vanguard party 
(Gramsci's euphemism under prison censorship was "social group") 
struggling to embody but also to resolve the real oppositions of 
capitalist society. 
Merely to juxtapose, however forcefully, Gramsci to Adorno on 
the subject of contradiction is not thereby to win or perhaps even 
make an argument. My immediate purpose has been to pry open a 
space again for discussion of committed protest in the specific sense of 
commitment to the only effective means of protest: the vanguard 
party. Perhaps this cannot be done convincingly within a tradition of 
Marxist theory and of the order of bourgeois protest which, in its 
Western form as represented by Benjamin, Sartre, Barthes, Marcuse, 
and Adorno, always already denies access to such an attempt. 
IV. Toward a Conclusion 
I write in a climate of opinion on the Left in which our most 
intelligent cultural theorists and critics continue to dismiss 
"communist vanguardism" out of hand as yet another variant, along 
with capitalism itself, of "the mindset of modernization."62 They 
conclude that we all move trapped in a "vicious circle" wherein "all 
seemingly cultural positions turn out to be symbolic forms of political 24




moralizing, except for the single overtly political tone, which suggests 
a slippage back into culture again."" In such a climate, genuine ques- 
tions concerning a theory and practice of commitment and of protest 
will continue to seem obviated. The only possible way out of such 
desperate circling must indeed appear from the perspective of the 
"left" to be located "besides praxis itself" (p. 65) rather than beside 
it. 
It may be untimely but appropriate, then, to conclude this essay 
on commitment and protest in literary theory and other cultural 
practices at the point where Sartre began his Cold War answer to the 
question "what is committed literature?"-namely the comment in 
1947 of un jeune imbecile: 
"If you want to commit yourself," writes a young imbecile, 
"what's holding you back? Join the Communist Party" ("Qu'est- 
ce que la litterature?" p. 57). 
Sartre himself came to value the term "idiot." It is now time that other 
Western Marxists commit themselves at least to reopening the ques- 
tion of his "imbecile." What is holding them back? 
NOTE S 
*An earlier version of this essay was delivered at and annual MLA session 
organized by Karl E. Webb, to whom I owe an opportunity to express ideas decidedly 
not his own. I also wish to thank Yuri Davydov, whom I have never met, but whose 
pathbreaking work on Western Marxism has decisively challenged my own under- 
standing of it. This essay is dedicated to him in hopes for common ground. 
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